It’s time for me to stroke you, dear reader. Congratulations for exposing yourself to important justice issues, issues that corporate news networks either do not have the time, or intelligence, to report. And, if you need further stroking, simply donate to any popular Hollywood cause–the accompanying “gala” will involve an orgy of “important” folks telling each other how important they are. Yes, the view from the back of a limo is rarely accurate, but often entertaining (especially upon exiting with a short skirt–don’t they see all those cameras out there?). Anyway.
There has been a long standing battle between those in favor of justice, and those who favor procedure. To understand this fight, we’ll use the real life case of Woodbury v. State. 730 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) Woodbury was convicted of a felony drug offense. His criminal defense attorney filed a one page Motion to Suppress, arguing an illegal search of the vehicle in which Woodbury was a passenger. The problem with the defense attorney’s argument was that he left out one important argument; an argument that would have won Woodbury’s case. Ouch. Well, isn’t that why we have appeals courts? Shouldn’t an appeal restore justice? Isn’t that the job of appellate judges?
Here’s the problem. The appellate court may only review arguments made by the initial defense attorney. If the first attorney didn’t make the proper argument, the appeals court will not consider an additional argument–even though they know a costly mistake was made. That’s what happened to Woodbury. The appeals court acknowledged that Woodbury’s search was completely unconstitutional. As such, Woodbury was wrongfully convicted of a felony drug offense. The appellate court’s opinion points out what the defense attorney did wrong on his motion: “the core question here should have been whether a dog alert on a vehicle, in and of itself, authorizes the arrest and search of all the occupants of that vehicle. The answer is no. . . . Unfortunately, the motion to suppress failed to clearly state this reason as a basis for suppression . . . [n]or did counsel ever present argument to the trial court that the search of Woodbury’s person based only on the dog alert on the vehicle was improper.” Id. at 356 [emphasis added]